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The proposal by Adam Smith that the market is a primal human reality has arguably been the most influential of the myths offered as a substitute for the authoritative story of Eden by the Enlightenment’s founding fathers. This essay examines how rival primal stories shape agents’ moral stances by directing attention, framing conceptual priorities and in situating stated and unstated analytical presuppositions by way of engaging with contemporary economic discourses. Primal myths (a term which I will be using non-pejoratively) are more conceptually and practically powerful than bald analytical assertions, which is why so many Enlightenment thinkers felt the need to overcome the Christian story of origins in order to criticize the cultural world that it held in place. They offered a kaleidoscope of competing protologies, each of which represented an attempt to re-imagine the “real” beginning of society in a way that made their proposed rearrangements of government (not monarchic) and economy (not feudal) as well as labor (not ruled by guilds) seem as common sense as the story of Eden that had once oriented the imagination of the old Medieval social order that was Christendom.
Contemporary scholars have recently emphasized that the root metaphor of Adam Smith’s economic theory is original barter. Tracing this scholarship, I will show how this basic picture of the human economic agent grounds the main features of the emerging global economic order. This vision will, however, then be shown to contrast with both the biblical vision of human economic activity (drawn from the primeval history in Genesis 2) the medieval and reformation theological appropriations of this vision, and the political and economic institutions that pre-modern Christendom developed to express their belief in a human responsibility to serve the divine feeding of the human race. I will conclude by suggesting why the transition from Christendom to modern global capitalism demands a deeper than usual theological analysis of phenomena we usually refer to under the heading of globalization, calling for reformulations of basic Christian and non-Christian presumptions about economic practice and ethics.
I. Smith and Original Barter
In the contemporary context it is useful to return to Smith as part of the effort to think theologically about economics because in his work we can more easily see western thought taking leave of traditional positions, drawing on and modifying earlier Christian constellations of thought to set up modern secular economics as a purely instrumental discipline. A recently appearing collection of essays has substantiated that though Smith was sensitive to and strongly resistant to the atomism of other social contract thinkers of his time,​[1]​ he was nevertheless unable to avoid making several crucial moves at the heart of his account of economics to yield a strong division of the realms private exchange and gift-giving from a conceptually amoral commercial realm that we now understand to be characteristic of “the market”. It is in this latter realm where the famous “invisible hand” is understood to be at work, which asks us to expect systemic good to come from individual self-centeredness.
John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government gives us a theological opening into this Enlightenment tradition of offering alternative protologies because in Book One he goes to some trouble to explain why moderns must not take the creation story recounted in Genesis as having any authority for understanding government or economics. Smith and Locke are aided in taking leave of theology, as always, by a theology, in this case a natural theology which “gave social legitimacy to natural science but also provided the key ordering principles of natural history” comments Peter Harrison.​[2]​ Drawing on commonplaces of the Scottish Enlightenment, Smith’s work presumes a benevolent deity who created the world for happiness and who continually, via providential action, leads it to this end. Smith is cribbing Calvin’s language of providence but squeezing Calvin’s theocentric idea that humans are made to glorify God through an anthropocentric inversion: this God is centrally invested in guaranteeing human happiness.​[3]​ 
The sloganesque idea of the benevolent invisible hand has tended to overshadow the more fundamental creation myth in which it is imbedded—of the primal market. This becomes apparent as soon as we ask what it is that the invisible hand guides, and Smith answers that it steers something intrinsic to human activity, namely, barter, trade and the acquisition of goods. The mythic origins of this human activity is described in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The anthropological substrate of his position is the surplus of human desire over bodily need. But where the Christian tradition had understood the allocation of the world’s produce to be a political task serving this physical need and thereby to restrain desire, Smith sees it as a divinely ordered process of natural forces, in which rulers and the poor are equally and involuntarily participants:
The rich only select from the heap [of the earth’s produce] what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor…in spite of their own natural selfishness and rapacity… They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species. When Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition. These too enjoy their share of all that it produces.​[4]​
What is important here for our purposes is that Smith is clearly interested in the problem of making sure that the earth’s produce finds its way to all people and in this the inheritor of the long tradition of Christian political thought. But at the same time Smith waves away the problem of political governance as one that the God of Providence will solve via the intrinsic human desire to “trade, truck and barter”. Whether the invisible hand is understood to enact special or general providence (and there is some debate on this point​[5]​), what is clearly fundamental in Smith’s protology and anthropology is the irreducibility of the market as both an anthropological constant and a mechanism for the proper allocation of the creation’s produce.
The idea of the invisible hand is thus only one particularly memorable inflection of a more basic myth of original barter. In the famous second chapter of book 1 of The Wealth of Nations Smith bluntly proposes that there is a “propensity in human nature…to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another… it is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts.”​[6]​ Two dogs pursuing a hare might look like they are coordinating their action, but each pursues only individual self-interest. A domesticated dog may do this in a more sophisticated manner, being affectionate toward to its master as it begs for table scraps, but this is only a show of affection aiming at filling the begging dog’s stomach. Drawing a parallel between humans and begging dogs, Smith proposes that humans as economic actors are more likely to be successful in satisfying their natural propensity to get what they want in economic exchange if they appeal to others’ self-love. This traditional Augustinian theme is thus ensconced in his new economic vision at a conceptually pivotal point:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.​[7]​ 
Now comes the crucial shift of scene in which Smith, borrowing from Islamic works on economic ethics,​[8]​ grounds his assertions in an appeal to a protological primitive human:
As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his companion; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to the field to catch them… And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business.​[9]​
In short, in Smith’s anthropology and protology, it is because we naturally barter and are good at different things that the division of labor and markets naturally springs up. Only later are precious metals, due to their portability, introduced as money which can simulate or monetize what is essentially a barter economy. This story has not only become our common sense but also foundational to the modern discipline of economics. It sustains the basic assumption that there is a thing called “the economy” that can be counted on to emerge in every society and which operates by its own rules independently of what might be going on in the moral and political life of a society.​[10]​ Within this imaginary, governments only get involved in economic activity late in the day, to ensure the maintenance of viable coinage, and otherwise need to stay out of the way if markets are to do all the good things the myth of primal barter and the invisible hand ask us to trust them to do.​[11]​
It is now obvious why, having made the market a constituent part of human nature, Smith is generally resistant to government interventions that seek to impose ideal plans on markets, which is seen as blinding government policymakers to the realities on the ground of the many spheres of human life out of which economic activity grows.​[12]​ What modern theorists conveniently overlook, however, is that Smith’s concern to limit governmental interference in markets is a critique of bad governance, and so stands within the traditional Christian account of rulers’ responsibility to oversee markets and is not its very modern successor, the view that the minimization of all government interference with economic exchange is desirable. Yet Smith has made his case in a way that very easily embraces the modern heresy that because the market is a primal reality, and God is involved to ensure that it is productive of human happiness, government intervention in economics is in principle immoral. Smith fulsomely denied this implication, which has become a matter of faith for modern Chicago-school economists, but his basic protology did make this conclusion very hard to resist in that his descriptions of what markets are has drastically foreshortened much more complex relations that, like the myth of the noble savage, are touchingly naive and very quickly begin to totter when basic historical investigations reveal that markets and money have over and over come into existence with and not before governments.
Several types of response to Smith’s primal barter myth seem quite obviously demanded of the theological ethicist. I have already mentioned the historical response—we don’t find markets arising out of original barter anywhere in history or in so-called primitive contemporary societies (this is David Graber’s thesis​[13]​). Research on how markets work also shows that the assumption that markets are “innocent” and tend to promote happiness is also, unsurprisingly, easily refuted on empirical grounds. Governments rightly get involved where markets will not risk economic interactions that may never turn a profit, such as—insuring mortgages, pensions, providing unemployment support, disability benefits, funding large scale infrastructural projects like nuclear energy and defense, or, of course, making student loans.​[14]​ The protology of original barter with its assumption of the spontaneously arising nature of markets as aspects of anthropological givens thus distorts how we understand government to work. As Joseph Stiglitz has regularly warned, there is no shortcut to capitalism without the institutions it takes to maintain it, such as courts with their legal and regulatory frameworks, systems of effective taxation, orderly banking systems and mechanisms for resolving commercial disputes, to name the tips of several large icebergs.​[15]​ More to the point: close observers of the contemporary market have conclusively shown that new or emerging markets are prone to rapacious behaviors because dominant parties tend to have better access to information about economic exchanges and the proper institutions have not been put in place to stabilize property rights and courts of arbitration.​[16]​ It is clear then that “all market bargaining occurs in the shadow of the law.”​[17]​  As we see most obviously in countries like Russia or Iraq, in which markets have been quickly put in place and “trusted” to produce good for the populace without appropriate supporting institutions, the result has tended distinctly in the direction of mafia-states. What Smith’s myth of the original market hides is the historical fact that his market theories were developed in the relatively stable and quite firmly governed context of western European Christendom, and only become toxic when pursued as an ideology shorn of the care for good governance which Smith both assumed and promoted.
While affirming these criticisms, I want to pursue a different set of theological criticisms of Smith, centrally of the doctrine of God assumed by his theory of the invisible hand.  Could not the love of riches and grandeur, Brendan Long asks, “produce a[n] invisible hand theory [in which] the negative aspects of our nature build caprice and jealousy that fuel themselves into a vicious cycle of unintentional, but no less real, cascading evil in societal structures?” ​[18]​ Smith simply assumes that this is not where we ought to expect self-love to take our collective economic life. This is an account in which the market, regulated with a light hand by the state, is conceived as itself perfectly capable of supplying human happiness and the equitable distribution of goods. The darkness that arises in human economic relationships must finally be suppressed by Smith because his whole anthropology and economic theory would collapse were he to admit that human acquisitive desire might lead to evil and not good. On these grounds many commentators have simply denied the reality of this idea notes Satz: “There is no invisible market hand automatically producing efficient outcomes; as Joseph Stiglitz has remarked, Adam’s Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is invisible because it is not there.”​[19]​ But clearly markets do exist, and just as clearly they can serve the welfare of societies. What then is the problem with this view? For Adrian Pabst the core issue remains theological.
…market relations are now seen as the precondition rather than the outcome of sociality. …[the market is] a universal mechanism of resource allocation [and so is] a precondition for the free pursuit of the ‘natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange’ in ways that are individually and collectively beneficial. As such, only a commercial society is capable of overcoming the hierarchical, vertical and iniquitous relationship of feudalism in favour of egalitarian, horizontal and just relations of capitalism.​[20]​
The original market is the primal story Smith holds out as the plan on which the concrete social ordering activity of governance can commence that will allow moral progress to be made out of the bad old world of feudal Christendom. He was not wrong at least, in his awareness that earlier Christians did believe that the Eden proctology remained perennially relevant for discussions of political governance and economics. 
II. Globalization as Test Case
I want to tease out ethical questions that have thus far been only hinted at by considering some aspects of globalization. I take the processes of globalization to be one of the prime practical effects of the hegemonic acceptance of Smith’s basic economic theory. I will assume it is uncontentious to define globalization as most basically a political arrangement of individual states to step back from regulating international trade, thereby ceding control of certain realms of economic exchange to private actors, whether individual or corporate. Paul Williams explains why it seems fair to describe such processes as transparent embodiments of the Smithian anthropology I have just outlined.
Capitalism as a system insists that all barriers to the creation of the largest possible market be removed. The language of capitalism describes such barriers as ‘regulations’, ‘customs’ and ‘restrictions’ on the market to be removed in order for growth to be realized. These barriers include any impediment to the free movement of goods and services, capital and labor. All such barriers are regarded as limitations to the development of an efficient market. All moral visions of the ‘good’ that they may embody are relativized in favour of increasing the range of choice over which individual expressions of utility can be maximized. … These processes actively undermine the possibility of rooted communities. This systemic logic of capitalism undermines the connections between people and places and in doing so, also encourages the objectification and use of the environment as nothing more than a resource to serve the consumption needs of humanity. The individual and systemic logics of capitalism thus act to reinforce each other in undermining the connections between people and places on the one hand and people and the past (in the sense of tradition, culture and moral norms) on the other.​[21]​
This suggests that a theological investigation of the ethics of globalization will be centrally concerned with the question of how human economic exchange is understood to arise, what ends it might serve, and how the institutions that support it might be configured to serve the flourishing of human life. One of the most fundamental ethical questions we must raise about globalization concerns how and how tightly linked local and national economies will need to be with transnational economic actors in order to promote the flourishing of all the people who are involved in these different layers of economic exchange across the globe. 
The question I would like to ask is this: Is globalization a largely benign and organic process that arises from people’s freely chosen desire to enrich themselves by cooperating more closely with others, or is it simply a new modality of the old colonial framework, which draws cheap labor into the economic system with threats or largely unfulfillable promises of future enrichment but with the primary aim of sustaining the wealth of the center? Does globalization express rising levels of co-operative behavior that inevitably happens when population densities get higher? Or is it primarily a mechanism whereby the dense and profligate “centers” of the modern global economy seek more effectively to harness the nations and peoples it drawn into the periphery of the economy so that their energy, life and profit are extracted from them? What seems clear is that globalization is a real process in which the consumption and wealth of the developed world dwarfs that of the newer entries into the global economy. It seems equally clear that Christians in the developed world tend generally to assume that globalization is a benign or even enriching social evolution in international politics and economics, and to do so without seriously investigating its effects on those who live their lives at the periphery.
I believe that we will gain important theological insights into these questions by revisiting the reasons why, for centuries, western Christians would have found the very idea of a global market as we now know it anathema. It is not my intention to demonize economic globalization, but simply to expose our ways of living to the eyes of the saints who have preceded us, and in many respects superseded us, in thinking theologically about the intersection of political governance and economic exchange. By tracing some of the history of economic practice in Christendom we will be reminded that globalization as we know it today is essentially a western project and therefore could only have begun from a shift in how the west thought about the purpose of the world’s goods, ownership and just trade. 
III. The Economics of Christendom
Up until the very eve of modernity, it was considered a duty of rulers (presumed to be Christian), to regulate markets. Those living in parts of Europe which existed in the medieval period are used to seeing market crosses or other signs of royal permission that physically designate market spaces. Markets could not just be held anywhere, but needed to be confined to place so that they could be overseen in order that just buying and selling could be guaranteed by the sovereign. The rulers of Christendom knew very well that their regulation of economic activity had two basic goals: to thwart organized theft, and to make sure that the poor had access to affordable necessities. Confining markets to specific places aimed to make policing of economic behavior possible. Not only were markets confined to specific places, but in the name of economic justice their times were also regulated. Markets were typically only allowed once a week and were organized in a manner that ensured that common poor people had access to goods in preference to financial speculators. A description of a market in England, in the city of Preston, was described as follows as late as 1795: “The weekly markets…are extremely well regulated…none but the town’s-people are permitted to buy during the first hour, which is from eight to nine in the morning: at nine others may purchase, but nothing unsold must be withdrawn from the market until one o’clock, fish excepted…”​[22]​ This market was free, in the modern sense that it was assumed that people’s buy and selling activity served their individual economic interests, but it was not assumed that all buyers and sellers were equivalent and all prices fair, as in contemporary “free market” language. In fact, up until this time a pure free market in a modern sense was considered barbarous. In Christendom a market constrained by moral concerns was considered the only permissible market, and completely free buying and selling, while permissible within limits between private parties, had no right to protection by the ruler, who also had reason to closely watch this “natural” trading to make sure that it did not graduate into exploitation by brigands.
A similar set of concerns also shaped Christendom’s theological account of ownership that underpinned this ethic of market regulation. The high medieval theological synthesis of Thomas Aquinas presents us with the essentially theological substrate of western thinking about property and markets in very terse compass. His account of justice is a long meditation on the implications of God’s creative activity for human economic behavior. Ownership, he begins, concerns power over material things. Thus in ultimate terms, creation cannot be owned by humans, because God alone has the power to create and change the essence of substances. Because human power is limited, when we speak of human ownership we are only speaking in relative terms about the right to use.​[23]​ The right to use rests on God’s designating the materiality of creation as for “the sustenance of man’s body”.​[24]​ Thus far Smith is wholly in agreement. But now they part company. God has given humans a command to have dominion over the earth, continues Aquinas, but the institution of ownership that this establishes is severely constrained because it must always serve the Creator’s own work of sustaining human life. Luther later picks up a crucial implication of Thomas’ starting point, stressing that human work and economic activity can never be productive in the sense that the Creator’s work is productive, but can only be responsive: “our labor is nothing more than the finding and collecting of God’s gifts; it is quite unable to create or preserve anything.”​[25]​ Though losing ground fast, that this view still appealed to those who felt distinctly uncomfortable with what was being lost amidst the roaring modernizing rationalization of the early modern period is evident in the writings of J. G. Hamann. “God help us if it were left to us to become the creator, inventor and smith of our future happiness. The first commandment is: you should eat (Gen. 2); and the last: come, everything is prepared. Eat, my dear ones, and drink, my friends, and be intoxicated.”​[26]​
In medieval Christendom and right through the Reformation and early modernity, then, economic thinking begins from the first command God gave to humans, by which their relation to the whole world was laid bare: “You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat,” (Gen 2:16b, 17a). Thomas is well aware that the pronouns here are plural, all the trees being given to all humanity, as all humanity is forbidden from the tree of knowledge.​[27]​ If the fruit of the world’s trees, rivers and forests as well as crop land and mines is God’s ongoing work of giving humans their daily bread, then the basic conceptual problem is how to justify private ownership at all. This is why in an unfallen state, continues Aquinas, private ownership would have been unthinkable. The fall, however, sets in play problems which make private ownership thinkable, but only as an allowable concession, on the condition that the way ownership is carried out actually serves the end for which the fruit of the world was given: human sustenance. This limited human ownership is ruled by conventional agreement​[28]​ toward the end of a better use of goods which are by definition for the common good.​[29]​ The concession rests on three conditions: First, that it foster delight in caring for a portion of creation, that it, second, promotes social order in caring for creation, and third, that it promote political peace by allowing people not to have to police their property. Also, fourth, because it is only of use and toward the end of the good of all, ownership is not a license to bar everyone else from all forms of use.​[30]​ The Christian must “possess external things, not as his own, but as common…ready to communicate them to others in their need”. This theological account of ownership has wide reaching implications still felt today. For instance, the Scottish right to roam law is a vestige of this limitation of ownership in Christendom which reminds property owners that their private ownership of land is not absolute, but limited to serve the goods of the whole, and thus does not extend to barring walkers from entering land. Other vestiges of this theological account of ownership are visible in contemporary laws that rule certain things entirely beyond the bounds of human ownership, such as parts of our bodies or other persons.​[31]​ This reasoning remains the origin of our modern moral and legal resistance to setting up markets in human organs, human trafficking or child labor, and grounds boundary debates about the womb rental in surrogate motherhood or the sale of sex in prostitution.​[32]​ 
The limits of private ownership are also revealed by extreme human need.​[33]​ Aquinas insists that a theological account of ownership, because resting on provisional arrangement justified only to ensure that the fertility of the earth that God gives actually makes it to the humans to whom God gives it, can never justify keeping the produce of creation from the needy. If a starving person takes what they need, it is not stealing, because she takes that for which the goods of the world were made. In such cases, what the starving person takes they legitimately own​[34]​ and a Christian, if necessary, may also take what is needed from others to serve such a person.​[35]​ Again we see a vestige of this understanding of economic justice in the rights accorded to squatters to live in unoccupied houses. While squatting law is offensive to a stronger account of property as essentially a freedom from interference from any other users, that squatting law still exists is a recognition of the need of the homeless taking a real if limited priority over the right of property owners to exclude them.
This idea of ownership also sustained another type of poor-protecting limit of ownership and markets, the idea of a commons, a form of property to which more than one person has usage rights. In the notion of “commons” we can begin to see the economic importance of Christendom’s understanding of ownership as simple right to use. In England (as most places in Europe) the theological tradition of Christendom generated a highly elaborate understanding of the commons. Common lands were held collectively by the residents of a parish or village. Thus a group of people owned fields, pastures, streams  and woods the use of which was carefully regulated by a layering of granting of use rights, here summarized by Lewis Hyde: 
Those who held a common right of pasturage could graze their cattle in the fields; those with a common of piscary might fish the streams; those with a common of turbary, might cut turf to burn for heat; those with a common of estovers might take wood necessary to heat, furnish or repair their houses. Everyone, the poor especially, had the right to glean after the harvest.​[36]​
The last point makes quite clear that these cultural and legal arrangements were expressly designed to honor biblical injunctions found at the heart of Israel’s vision of economic justice: “When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap to the very edges of your field, or gather the gleanings of your harvest. You shall not strip your vineyard bare, or gather the fallen grapes of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and the alien: I am the Lord your God.” (Leviticus 19:9-10). In fact, the whole commons system is an institutional elaboration of reverence for this biblical vision of economic justice and the gospel promise that “all these trees I give to you”. As slaves brought out of servitude into a fruitful land, Israel had special reason to insist that the fruit of the land not be controlled by despotic pharos but given to all human beings. The cultural and legal institutions of Israel are understood as being just only if they do not thwart God’s stated desire to feed all humans. Israel’s legal and agricultural institutions were therefore configured to hand on this divinely given fruitfulness. In the English case, the right to “estovers” is a direct explication of this right to subsistence, the English term coming from the French estovoir, “to be necessary”. Thus to have the rights of estovers is to have the right of subsistence gathering, a right granted by a community, to all members of the community to common land and resources. These rights in commons were a premodern form of social security, the patrimony of the poor. The institution also formed a barrier against the tyranny of government and business speculation as ensconced in the British Magna Carta of 1217, which specified that the widow shall have “reasonable estovers in the common”. In short, it is now apparent that Aquinas’ account of the reasons for limits for ownership and trade represent a direct attempt to explore in his own age the institutional implications of the biblical vision of the precedence of God’s provision and care over human ownership and production. 
Another feature of the institution of the commons is also clearly a development of Aquinas’ understanding that use rights must be organized and limited. The commons proved a renewable communal resource for centuries precisely because no one had the right to unlimited use. If, for instance, a 17th century English farmer had the right to cut rushes on the commons, he would have the right to do so for a certain period of time, such as between Christmas and Candlemass (Feb. 2). Similarly, one might be a holder of the right to cut tree branches, but only up to a certain height, and only after November. More complex rights could be held by those who owned private land, such as grazing rights, again nicely summarized by Hyde: 
If you were a farmer who held what were called “rights of common, appendant,” you were constrained in the following ways: you must own land within the manor; you must actively cultivate your own land, your rights to the common pasture on “the lord’s waste” arising out of your need to pasture your cattle in the summer when you are cultivating; you may only pasture beasts needed in agriculture (oxen and horses to plow, sheep and cows to manure); you may only pasture your beasts during the growing season, when your land is under cultivation; you must not put more animals on the Lord’s land in summer than your own land can feed in the winter. In short, you must own and cultivate land distinct from the commons, and your use of the commons is limited by the size of your holding, limited in the kind of animal you may pasture, and limited to certain times of year.​[37]​
It is now becoming more evident that the commons is a culturally rich way of understanding what and who land is for. Land is for feeding people, especially the needy, and the tradition of common ownership represents a political and cultural institution designed to recognize the biblical vision of the world’s fruit as given to every human. The commons is a socialized admission that because of the fallen condition, various sorts of social forms are necessary to make sure that the stream of fruit that flows from creation gets to those in need, and is not simply diverted by the powerful and used for their own ends and to their own profit. The same rules underlay the limitation and regulation of markets. In summary, it is quite clear that Christendom up until the modern period was still deeply marked by cultural forms in which human beings were hearing and exploring the command of God regarding the fruit of the land as they practiced and regulated ownership and trade.
It would take us too far afield to trace the slow evolution of this account of social order into the quite different configuration we now refer to with the term globalization or global free markets. Along the way we would have to talk about several seminal conceptual changes which we can only mention in passing now. In my view the most critical is the displacement of a basic picture of the land as fertile and God’s means of feeding people (as suggested by the Genesis account), with a new picture in which the world is seen as a waste needing to be improved in order to be valuable. 
John Locke was the most influential defender of this position, and his was very clearly a theological narrowing of the medieval Christian synthesis, drawing on but narrowing Aquinas’ understanding of the image of God as rational in order to defend his emphasis on the ways humans improve on given creation. 
labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things, we enjoy in this World: And the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckon’d in, as any, or at most, but a very small, part of it; So little, that even amongst us, Land that is left wholly to Nature, that hath no improvement of Pasturage, Tillage, or Planting, is called, as indeed it is, wast; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.​[38]​ 
Given this new emphasis on the de novo creative power of human work, we can also understand why Locke was to become the main protagonist of an account of property as absolutely inviolable which has become dominant in the English speaking world. 
As we have seen, Smith’s theology also emerged not as a conceptual innovation, but a subtle shift in the emphases of the medieval account of economics. Agreeing with the claim that the notion of property serves the end of distributing the bounty of the earth in a fallen world, Smith denies that governance oversees this process. He agrees with Aquinas that trade can enrich both parties involved, but rejects any idea of just price as a mechanism for ensuring trade is good for all parties​[39]​ by simply asserting that trade is by definition for the common advantage of both parties whatever the price both parties can agree upon. Thus Smith turns Aquinas’ account of economic injustice into the paradigm of economic justice. Just price, Aquinas allows, “is not fixed with mathematical precision” but nevertheless, there is a justice in exchange which is not reducible to market rates. Thomas even musters the words Augustine’s authority to refute the precise idea that has become, for us, the definition of economics: “All men are inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality this is wicked, it is in every man’s power to acquire that justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination. [Augustine] then gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.”​[40]​ Smith’s revision of Aquinas has expelled God from economics as well as governance.

IV. Globalization and Christian Ethics
I have lingered over lost worlds of the economic ethics of Christendom not in order to propose a romantic return to any of them, but to indicate ways in which they display a more theologically and morally serious quest to establish cultural and institutional forms that supported equitable trade practices than our concepts allow us to be as we stand in what Francis Fukyama has famously called “the end of history”—in the period when we are supposed to have no choice but to be capitalists in one form or another because all rival economic systems have failed.​[41]​ Contemporary Christian visions of economic justice seem to have lost any sense of the richness of earlier theological thought about how economic life might be humanely steered and as a result have tended to assume that the only role Christians can play in the processes of globalization is as voices supporting its more moral versions of extant practices or as occasional protesters against its more flagrant injustices.​[42]​ With precious few exceptions, contemporary Christians have assumed that globalization is a benign process of the extension of the power and reach of “free markets” which cannot but benefit all who it touches. I have taken a tour through the theological history of the west in order to draw attention to the fact that Christians in other ages would have had some substantive worries about this assumption, not least because it does not seem to rest on any serious engagement with the ways Christians understood basic economic concepts in such richly theological terms so clearly on display in the earlier tradition. 
It therefore behooves contemporary Christians to pay attention to thinkers who draw on the vestiges of this tradition to try to ask more probing questions of the processes of globalization. The recent Empire trilogy in political philosophy written by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri draws attention to aspects of the processes of globalization which Christians from previous ages could have appreciated. They observe, for instance, that the free market is in fact not free in the sense of unconstrained and undirectable, but, like the medieval notion of the commons, rests on many forms of co-operation and planning. Actions are coordinated to steer the global economic system at a range of nodes in the global financial system, such as the meetings at Davos, the G8 summits, World Bank and International Monetary Fund meetings. The necessity of such meetings reveals that, despite the rhetoric of “free markets,” and “invisible hands” which presumes the validity of the Smithian presumption that “the markets” operate as independent agents who cannot be controlled, and do so without governmental interventions, the freedom of markets must be constantly maintained by grooming the political arrangements among governments that allow investments and markets of a certain type to emerge and continue. It is therefore false to say that “less” economic control by governments is different in kind from “more” interventions in markets. What is at issue is the kind of governmental interventions that will be structured into economic relations.​[43]​ 
Hardt and Negri also draw on the medieval Christian emphasis on the end and purpose of ownership in the face of the dominant Lockean emphasis on inviolable property rights. Law, they say, recalling the traditional Christian position represented by Aquinas, does not create property, but does justify private property solely on the grounds that it contributes to the common good to do so. It is this sentiment that we saw functioning to limit the things that humans had a right to own, and why we still continually talk about the proper limits of intellectual property. Such thinking about the appropriate limits of ownership becomes highly relevant as the reach of private ownership goes deeper and deeper into the human patrimony. Hardt and Negri recall that the commons was designed to recognize some things as given to the whole of humanity, things like air and water, and also plant and animal species as a whole. But in a globalized world, the processes of the capturing of various forms of commons for private ownership is proceeding at a rapid pace.​[44]​ The traditional insistence that some things ought not to be owned because they are given to all humanity is being dissolved on precisely the grounds of economic free trade that are the central goal of globalization. To take one far reaching example, a floodgate to a new world was opened in 1980 when the US Supreme Court ruled that life can be made and patented,​[45]​ writing into law the Lockean account of human work as the only significant contributor to economic value. Theologically we can see that the shift in emphasis from Thomas and Luther, who upheld the fertility of the world as a gift and possession of God alone, via Locke and Smith, has flowered in the complete displacement of any place for the givenness of the world being valuable in public discourse and governmental policy. Homo faber is victorious as the basic source of human wealth and security. Precisely because we can no longer differentiate between the things that are given by the Creator and the “values” that humans “add” to these things, moderns continually make the theologically grave mistake of confusing the gathering and manipulation of creation’s given form with ex nihilo creation. “Give us our daily bread” is now for us glossed as, “Give us the will and creativity to procure and ensure our supply of daily bread. (Desire we can count on.)”
I will draw this analysis together by way of one example that displays why more deep and careful theological investigation of the processes of globalization is important if Christians are not to simply valorize a neo-colonial global system of global governance in their embrace of global finance and trade. A tight linkage here obscures rather than seeks the sort of justice that we see in scripture to be given as the way of life. The global south is genetically rich in terms of plant species, as compared with the global north. This given distribution of the planet’s genetic diversity is beginning to be exploited in a novel way through the emerging infrastructures of globalization. It is now becoming commonplace for experts from the north, which has much more highly developed scientific and legal ownership regimes, to survey and patent the genomes of various equatorial and sub-equatorial plants and animals. From the perspective of the north, since the scientific labor of extracting a description of the genetics of plants is a highly skilled activity, this knowledge and therefore the species to which it belongs can be patented. By this means (via international businesses) the usefulness of the earth’s natural bounty is made more widely available. That some have resisted this account of recent developments as well as this new “distribution mechanism” of the earth’s fertility has resulted are the so-called the “seed wars,” in which large international corporations, having once spent the effort to sequence and patent a genetic sequence, now use those very patents to forcibly bar people from the traditional cultivation and use of those plants or animals. 
The neem tree in India presents one particularly flagrant example of issues at stake. For centuries farmers have ground the seed of this tree and spread them on their fields, exploiting their natural properties as an insect repellent. In 1985, W. R. Grace and Company, a US based multi-national chemical and agribusiness company, was granted a patent for the neem plant, which it could then market as an organic, non-toxic pesticide. Despite being challenged (unsuccessfully) in the US courts, this ruling validated the co-option of the common heritage of humanity by private propriety control. Over the next 12 years over 40 patents were granted for products based on the neem tree. A similar story can be told about the medicinal properties of Tumeric, which was a traditional remedy for scrapes and burns in India. In this case a patent held by the University of Mississippi medical center was overturned in 1996, not because tumeric had already been serving as a medicine in India for generations, but because its efficacy had previously been documented in (western) scientific publications. In another irony of this modern enclosure of the commons, the fact that people were adept at using the neem plant and turmeric, and clearly knew their efficacy is not counted as a form of ownership. A natural substance can now, under the new bioproperty laws, be owned only if its usefulness has been documented in a western scientific journal.​[46]​
The presumption that human creativity and trade is the engine of all real economies is a theological mistake which not only allows, but celebrates, the theologically absurd practice in which appropriations of the fertility of creation by those in the global south of the organisms God gave to all is curtailed or stripped without compensation by global corporations based in the north. Another irony of this new repudiation of the commons is that the same global corporations are now similarly breaking down traditional farming practice in the heartlands of the developed west, aggressively pursuing farmers who might clean and save their own soybean seeds in the United States, since these seeds may contain propriety gene sequences.​[47]​ A similar dynamic is visible in the harvesting of human tissues pharmaceutical companies, universities and hospitals profiting immensely from tumor cells that they found in individual humans, but who are not legally entitled to any of the profits made from their own diseases.​[48]​ 
In conclusion, it does not seem far-fetched to suggest that theologically serious investigation of the mechanics of modern globalization is still very much in its infancy because Christians rarely ask anymore what it might mean for Jesus to have held out the promise to every human being that the Trinitarian God cares for his or her daily bread—and configuring economic ethics as an investigation of whether or not our economic practices thwart or serve that divine giving. What is distinctive about such an approach is not only its reapprotiation of some traditional, biblical and theological material, but also its capacity to resist the modern celebration of human agency in economic affairs more effectively than theologies resting on analogies from the life of the inner trinity ​[49]​or which endow human work with eschatological permanence.​[50]​
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